For all purposes, he looked like a Kashmiri. Tall, fair, bearded and wearing a pheran made of dark fabric, he was a familiar figure in Srinagar’s mosques where secessionist preachers spat fire and venom against the Indian state. It was his job to identify them, have them followed and find a suitable place to abduct them. Usually, it would be one of the crowded bylanes in Srinagar’s shopping areas where an unmarked white Maruti van would suddenly appear, and men with scarves around their faces would hustle the preacher into the vehicle. In Kashmir, where terrorism is like mercury that dips and rises according to the heat, these operations are routine. Only, the tall man in the mosque was not a Kashmiri terrorist or Hurriyat sympathiser, but a trained Military Intelligence (MI) operative. Neither were the masked kidnappers agents of terror, but part of a crack MI unit that specialised in whisking away potential threats. The suspect would be taken to a secret location and interrogated for leads. “If anyone spoke to me in Kashmiri, my cover would’ve been blown,” he says with a humourless laugh. “I can barely speak three words of it.”
Translating the language of terror is the main challenge facing India’s Intelligence agencies today. They have warned twice in February through “high priority” dispatches that soft locations —hotels, schools and security camps in Srinagar—could be in the crosshairs of Pakistan-sponsored Islamist terrorists.
It is unlikely that Hafeez Saeed and his ilk are familiar with Winston Churchill’s “attacking the soft belly policy”, but seems to be one being adopted by them to sow fear and panic.
In a country of 1.2 billion, with over 1,60o cities and towns, 19 nuclear power plants, 35 major hydro and thermal power projects, 18 oil refineries, 28 major ports, over 7,000 railway stations, 62 domestic and 22 international airports, 21 high courts, myriad public buildings and monuments big and small that are all symbols of what India stands for, are vulnerable to terror attack. India’s sprawling Intelligence and police network—which is constantly acting under political pressure —has so far kept terror casualties to a minimum. In the last decade, actionable Intelligence thwarted over 4,200 terror attempts on Indian soil while neutralising at least 2,600 terror modules.
The MI, similarly, has been preventing infiltration attempts, attacks on India’s 52 cantonments, ordinance depots, military academies and other army buildings. The challenge for the Indian Intelligence apparatus is diminishing Humint (intelligence gathered through informants), and an increasing dependence on technical surveillance.
India, a soft target
According to the 2012 Global Terrorism Index compiled by the US and Australia-based Institute for Economics and Peace, India ranks first among countries most vulnerable to attacks by Islamic terrorists.
In October last year, Delhi Police prepared a list of 460 important and vulnerable places that could be attacked by Pakistan-based terror groups.
The state of high alert in security establishments was triggered by the substantial amount of arms and ammunition recovered from terrorists. In the last 20 years, over 12,600 kg of RDX and 31,500 kg of other explosives, including 4,660 rockets, were recovered from various modules plotting to carry out attacks in India.
Security analyst Ajay Sahni believes terrorists are looking for soft targets in India because their own capability has been eroded.“They are looking for unprotected areas. Although there is threat to nuclear establishments and sensitive government buildings, there are several layers of security arrangements I’m sure can’t be penetrated,” Sahni said.
However, Major General (retd) Afsir Karim differed on the issue of soft target contending that lax security arrangements in oil refineries are open invitation to terrorist groups like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
“If you pass by Mathura oil refinery, the poor security is appalling. The terrorist groups are looking for such opportunities. We should not blame anybody else for such poor security and Intelligence, but ourselves,” Karim said, adding that the political establishment was slowly killing the security and Intelligence apparatus required to prevent such attacks.
Analysis of Intelligence alerts issued in the last year revealed that nuclear establishments, hotels, offices of Indian Space Research Organisation, oil refineries and power projects remained prime targets of terror outfits.
The challenge before investigators is getting to the root of the origins of the plot and the perpetrators. There have been four targeted attacks on India’s vulnerable rail networks since August 2000, killing 280 innocent passengers. While two cases were solved, investigations into two other incidents, including the 2001 blast in Rishikesh-Hardwar-Delhi Passenger train, remain a mystery.
Among major terrorist attacks since 2001, at least eight cases are still under investigation. They include the April 2001 explosion in Memnagar, Ahmedabad. The modus operandi and terror outfit behind the blast are yet to be identified. Similarly, investigation into the December 2002 BEST bus blast in Ghatkopar, Mumbai, failed to yield any result.
Crowded locations have always been easy targets for terrorists. “There are plenty of such locations in all cities and towns of this country. The target could be a market, a shopping mall, a carnival or a theatre. It is in these places that the terrorists seek to inflict maximum fatalities and thereby greater focus on his actions and cause,” said an officer who has handled counter-terrorism work.
Metro and railway stations and bus terminus too fall in the same category of crowded locations when it comes to potential terror targets.
All static military formations in the country, whether they are based within a cantonment or otherwise, are considered serious terror targets in the country, for the potential damage and the message it could send across the whole nation.
Among the other military institutions that figure among the targets of anti-India forces are the Chennai-based Officers Training Academy, Dehradun-based Indian Military Academy, Pune-based National Defence Academy, Ezhimala-based Naval Academy and Dindigul-based Air Force Academy.
These training institutions apart, terror groups may also target military formations such as the Command Headquarters of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, and other smaller formations spread across the country, apart from the naval bases in Mumbai, Goa, Kochi and Visakhapatnam, and the innumerable air bases.
India’s religious centres such as temples, mosques, churches or gurudwaras continue to be under constant vigil. Topping the target list is the hilltop Vaishno Devi Temple in Jammu and Kashmir that has been on the terror radar for a long time now.
Terror groups definitely want to target key installations of India to inflict maximum damage. The disaster that such attacks could cause is not just calamitous, but could also cripple the economy.
Indian intelligence agencies have assessed that such terror attacks could happen at installations such as hydropower projects, dams, oil exploration sites and installations offshore, atomic power plants, and even the stock exchanges, be in Mumbai or Delhi.
A terror attack on a dam could flood smaller states and Union territories. Similarly, strikes at hydropower plants could cripple electricity grids that could have an impact on both civilian lives and economic activity.
Strikes on nuclear power plants not only pose a threat to India’s capacity to meet its energy needs, but also are an environmental hazard of mammoth proportions that could take years to mitigate.
Ineffective counter terrorism?
If the threat is so real, then why is it that India has failed to implement a proper structure when other countries, especially the US, have managed to put together a centralised system to prevent another 9/11?
“The FBI’s budget is $8 billion, while our NIA, which is mandated to fight terror, gets only $12.53 million. It is hundred times more and we still compare ourselves with the US. They have spent trillions of dollars on internal security and look at our budget. It is embarrassing. Our political establishment is giving illusions of security but not the real security,” Sahni said.
All we need to do is simply convert the FBI budget in Indian currency, and the figures speak for themselves. While FBI, a department, gets Rs 43,000 crore annually, India’s total internal security budget is only Rs 59,000 crore. And that includes expenditure for all agencies, security forces and grant to state governments as well as procurement and modernisation of police force to secure the nation.
India has three primary agencies —IB, RAW and NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation)—to gather Intelligence and pass it on to security agencies. Besides, NIA was raised in 2008 to carry out operations to neutralise terror elements. There is a proposal for a National Counter Terrorism Centre on the lines of US NCTC.
In the states, special task forces and anti-terror squads are tasked with anti-terrorism operations. They are supposed to work in coordination with the Central agencies. However, cat fights between agencies are common.
There is also open turf war between STF and NIA over territory. A senior official said there is a general feeling within STF that NIA is trying to use Intelligence generated by STF to claim credit. NIA says STF is reluctant to coordinate to crack terror cases.
Adding saffron terror to the terrorscape has politicised the issue. Furthermore, in Kashmir and the North-east, the turf war between the army and the local law enforcement agencies is so intense that information is not shared at all, allowing snarks to make hay.
But, Sahni argues that there is fine difference between structure and a working structure.
“USNCTC is toothless, although it is backed by organisations like CIA and FBI. We don’t need Rambos to prevent terror attacks. We need general policing and general Intelligence gathering mechanism,” he said.
Sahni recalled the analysis of CCTV camera footage of VT station in Mumbai during 26/11, in which a policeman is trying to shoot the terrorist Ajmal Kasab using an archaic gun. “He couldn’t fire straight. Today, the majority of state police personnel can’t aim the gun properly. It is embarrassing.”
Intelligence crisis
The first line of defence against terrorism is actionable Intelligence. However, raising human assets in border villages with the objective of gathering information on suspicious activities of terror groups is an uphill task.
Counter-terrorism along the border requires a local network of informers who are paid at each army post. Army officers complain of informers not just taking money from different posts trading the same information, but also that some of them are police informers who get paid by the cops for the info he has just shared with the Army. “In many cases the informers work as double agents,” said an MI source who has worked in Kashmir. “So we just pick him up, keep him for a few hours and set him free. This is worse than jailing or torture simply because he is then suspected by terrorists of having shared information with the Army. In many cases, they are bumped off,” he said.
Terrorists are aware of virtual drought in Humint pool and reliance on technical intelligence. An officer said terrorists have become smarter now and they avoid communicating through phone and email.
What next?
Despite the criticism the police and Intelligence agencies face, there has been no major terror attack in Mumbai since 26/11 and none in Delhi since the 2006 Sarojini Nagar blasts.
“We are fighting against odds,” said a former top police officer who retired recently. “We must be doing something right. There are areas in Delhi like Batla House where the cops have been told not to enter by the home ministry,” he said, adding, “You can imagine how demoralised the police are.”
The feeling is similar among ATS officials who are unwilling to stick their neck out for fear of being jailed for trying to arrest terrorists. “One of them dies in an encounter, the human rights organisations cry foul and an inquiry is instituted,” said a Special Cell officer.
Penetration of terror cells or groups sympathetic to their cause is the most difficult task. According to officials, this is getting more and more difficult since the modules have become increasingly watchful, making the role of technical intelligence that much more important.
In 2006, the IB tech Intelligence unit intercepted calls to Muridke in Pakistan from Bagalkot in Karnataka. The caller, Habib, was picked up in a joint operation and explosives recovered. Subsequent interrogation revealed that he was planning to attack reservoirs and power installations in Karnataka.
Similarly, terrorist Zubair was netted by the Intelligence unit last year while trying to pass on sensitive information related to defence establishments to his handler in Delhi.
Of the recent major successes for Indian Intelligence agencies in their counter-terrorism operations, the Hyderabad-Bangalore joint operation in August 2012 is touted as one of the best.
It was the arrest in Hyderabad of a small-time Bangalore-based rowdy that led to the busting of a terror module in Karnataka that was planning major attacks on civilian targets across the state.
He spilled the beans during interrogation, thereby helping the Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka police to carry out a joint operation to crack the terror module. It was a six-month job that ended with the arrest of 11 terror suspects in Bangalore and Hubli on August 26, 2012.
The module had allegedly prepared a hit list of top Indian politicians from both Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka to bump off, apart from taking out some vital military installations based in south India, based on directives from LeT and HuJI handlers based in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Thus the cat and mouse game between the terrorists and the Intelligence establishments continues. Part of the Intelligence is psychological warfare. A former operative who worked in the North-east during the worst period of insurgency recalled interrogations being carried out, filmy style, under a naked bulb and two chairs with a table in between. Large portions of the walls of the room would be covered with flesh and blood, indicating fiendish torture. The
suspects, seeing the gore, would be so terrified at the pain that awaited them that would start singing immediately. “We didn’t even have to ask questions,” said the officer. “What they did not know was that the stuff on the walls was pieces of meat and blood we got from the local butcher, which we then smeared on the walls.” In real life, the flesh and blood are only too real.
UNDER THREAT
Tamil Nadu
- Kanyakumari: Vivekananda Rock
- Kudankulam: Nuclear power plant
- Madurai: Meenakshi Temple
- Kalpakkam: Atomic power plant
- Mettur: Dam
- Avadi: Heavy vehicles factory
- Chennai: Harbour, MAC Stadium, Officers Training Academy
- Thiruvananthapuram: Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre
- Kochi: Cochin shipyard
- Mullaperiyar: Dam
- Ezhimala: Naval academy
- Bangalore: Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
- Indian Space Research Organisation
- Chinnasamy Stadium
- Indian Institute of Science
- Karwar: Naval base
- Kaiga: Nuclear power station
- Shriharikota: Satish Dhawan Space Centre
- Nalgonda: Nagarjuna Sagar Dam
- Visakhapatnam: Naval base
- Charminar
- Golkonda fort
- Tank Bund
- Rajiv Gandhi Int'l Airport
- Balasore: DRDO missile testing centre
- Puri: Jagannath Temple
- Konark: Sun Temple
- Harbour
- Naval base
- Mazagon Dock Ltd
- Bombay Stock Exchange
- Offshore oil installations
- Railway system
- Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus
- National Defence Academy
- Nuclear power station
- Naval base
- Shipyard Gujarat
- Akshardham Temple
- Atomic power station
- Major temples
- Court complex
- Sankat Mochan Temple, airport Uttarakhand
- Indian Military Academy
- Officers Training Academy
- Buddhist centre
- Tibetan government in exile
- Nathpa Jhakri hydropower project
- Bhakra Dam
- Nangal Dam
- Golden Temple
- Tourist spot
- Oil refinery
- Tourist spot
- Vaishno Devi Temple
- Baglihar Dam
- Parliament House
- National Defence College
- Metro Rail
LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
Founded by terrorist Hafiz Saeed in 1990, LeT runs recruitment and training centres in Muzaffarabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Multan and Quetta in Pakistan. Over 2,000 franchisees of the terror outfit are controlled from its headquarters in Muridke.
Banned by Pakistan, US, UK and India, LeT uses charity organisation Jamat-ud-Dawa as a front.
TARGETS: India, US, UK and Chechnya
MODUS OPERANDI: LeT was the first to carry out fidayeen (suicide) attacks in Jammu & Kashmir, targeting security forces and non-Muslim civilians through two sub-groups—Jaan-e-Fidai and Ibn-e-Tayamiah.
STRIKES
December 28, 2005: Indian Institute of Science campus in Bangalore, 1 killed
October 29, 2005: New Delhi serial blasts, 61 killed
March 7, 2006: Varanasi serial blasts, 27 killed
November 7, 2006: Mumbai serial blasts, 200 killed
November 26, 2008: Attack at Taj, Oberoi and Mumbai CST, 166 killed
JAISH-E-MOHAMMED
Responsible for the audacious fidayeen attack on Parliament in 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammad was launched in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, following his release in the IC 814 hostage swap deal on December 31, 1999. Jaish is aided by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and has links with other terror groups.
TARGETS: India, Westerners in Pakistan and Afghanistan
MODUS OPERANDI: Jaish actively recruits cadres from PoK and Jammu & Kashmir to carry out fidayeen attacks.
STRIKE
December 2001: Parliament attack
INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN
An extension of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), IM came into the spotlight in 2007 with serial blasts in Varanasi and Faizabad. Founded by Bhatkal brothers Yasin and Riyaz, IM is the first home-grown terror outfit. IM is reportedly funded by LeT and Saudi Arabia-based Al Bashir.
TARGET: India
MODUS OPERANDI: IM extensively uses IEDs made of a mixture of RDX and ammonium nitrate, which is wrapped in a polythene sheet supported by a semi-circular wooden casket to give direction and thrust to shrapnels, thus inflicting maximum damage. A signature tiffin box and bicycle has been used by the outfit since 2007. The group also has a tradition of sending emails to TV channels immediately after blasts to claim responsibility.
STRIKES
August 25, 2007: Two blasts in Hyderabad leave 42 dead
November 23, 2007: Serial blasts at Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad civil court premises. Fifteen killed.
May 13, 2008: Nine blasts in Jaipur, 80 killed
July 25, 2008: Eight low-intensity blasts in Bangalore. Two killed.
July 26, 2008: Seventeen blasts in 10 Ahmedabad localities claim 53 lives
September 13, 2008: Five blasts in three Delhi localities leave 24 dead
February 13, 2010: Bomb blast at German Bakery in Pune. Seventeen killed.
December 7, 2010: Blast at Sheetla Ghat, adjacent to Dashashwamedh Ghat in Varanasi. Two killed.
July 13, 2011: Three blasts at Zaveri Bazaar, Opera House and Kabutarkhana in Mumbai. Twenty six dead.
September 7, 2011: Blast at Delhi High Court. Fifteen killed.
August 1, 2012: Five low-intensity blasts at Jangli Maharaj Road in Pune. One injured.
HIZB-UL-MUJAHIDEEN
Another franchisee of anti-India groups financed by ISI, HM was raised in 1989 in Muzaffarabad in Pakistan to carry out terror activities in India. With a cadre strength of at least 1,500 modules, the outfit is active in Bandipora-Baramulla, southern division for Anantnag and Pulwama districts and Rajouri.
TARGET: India
MODUS OPERANDI: The outfit has its own news agency—Kashmir Press International—used as a propaganda mouthpiece. It also has a women’s wing called Banat-ul-Islam.
STRIKES: HM provided logistical support to Pak-based terror outfits LeT and Jaish for several attacks in the valley. It also aided in the Delhi High Court attack.
HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN
Earlier known as Harkat-al-Ansar, the outfit was rechristened in 1997. According to Intelligence sources, HuM was responsible for hijacking IC 814 in December 1999. The outfit headed by Fazlur Rehman Khalil has strong ties with Taliban leader Mullah Omar.
TARGET: India, USA, UK
MODUS OPERANDI: HuM was probably the first group to use hijacking to make a terror statement in India. Armed with logistic support from Al-Qaida and blessings of ISI, HuM has been recruiting and training youths in the Kashmir valley.
STRIKES
July, 1995: HuM and Al-Farn kidnapped and killed five Westerners.
December, 1999: Hijacked IC 814
January, 2002: Kidnapped and killed American journalist Daniel Pearl
June, 2007: Two Indian soldiers killed in fidayeen attack
HARKAT-UL-JIHAD- AL-ISLAMI
The first Deobandi militant outfit founded in the 1980s to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan is backed by Tablighi Jamaat. Headed by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the terror outfit was earlier known as Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen (JAA). It changed identity in mid-1990 to aid the separatist movement in J&K.
TARGETS: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, UK and US.
MODUS OPERANDI: Supported by SIMI, HuJI penetrated western Uttar Pradesh and recruited hundreds of sleeper cells in the early 2000s.
STRIKES
October, 2005: Fidayeen attack at STF office in Hyderabad kills one
November, 2007: Aided serial blasts in Varanasi in which 25 were killed
July, 2008: Aided serial blasts in Ahmedabad which killed 56
AL- AKHTAR TRUST
An offshoot of Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al-Akhtar is registered as a humanitarian organisation, but is used primarily as a courier agency to deliver arms and ammunition to various terror groups in Pakistan.
TARGETS: India, UK and USA
MODUS OPERANDI: Al-Akhtar provides financial support to terrorist groups in J&K. In the last few years, it changed names at least four times to disguise its anti-India activities.
STRIKES
According to Intelligence sources, Al-Akhtar financed the operation that led to the killing of Daniel Pearl.
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